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PICKING AT MORALS: ANALYTICAL 
JURISPRUDENCE IN THE AGE OF 
NATURALIZED ETHICS 
ALINA NG BOYTE* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Morality has a central place in the field of jurisprudence and legal 
theory. Though the precise relationship between law and morality is deeply 
controversial among jurists and scholars, morality as a concept has 
nevertheless been instructive in how lawyers and judges think about law.1 
In many ways, morality embodies a universal code of personal and societal 
values that guide human behavior and seems to parallel the law’s ideals of 
justice, fairness, and integrity. Thus, it is not surprising that some scholars, 
particularly from the natural law tradition, assert that morality is an 
essential condition for any valid system of law.2 Other scholars disagree. 
For legal positivists, laws do not have to embody and incorporate moral 
ideals because laws are, by nature, socially contingent and independent of 
moral ideals.3 Yet other scholars, while believing that laws and morals are 
                                                
*  This work was supported by grant from Mississippi College School of Law. I am thankful to 
Blake Hollingsworth for excellent research assistance. 
1  On the highly controversial issue of abortion for example, the Supreme Court upheld, the 
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, an Act that bans abortions that involve partial delivery of a 
living fetus only to end the fetus’s life, as constitutional. One of the determining factors that led a young 
Roberts court to uphold the ban on a specific method of abortion and reframe the abortion debate was 
the effect that a late term abortion would have on the emotional and mental state of the expectant 
mother and society as a whole. As the Court stated, the State “has an interest in ensuring so grave a 
choice [as late-term abortion] is well informed. It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her 
choice to abort must struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, 
only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and 
vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the human form …. The State's 
interest in respect for life is advanced by the dialogue that better informs the political and legal systems, 
the medical profession, expectant mothers, and society as a whole of the consequences that follow from 
a decision to elect a late-term abortion.”  
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007). The Supreme Court also recently decided, in a 
same sex marriage case, that the institution of marriage is central to the human condition and the right 
to marry must be equally extended to same sex couples. Citing Confucius and Cicero, Justice Kennedy 
stated that marriage transforms “strangers into relatives binding families and societies together” and 
should be a right that is extended to same sex couples because of the dignity that the institution affords 
all who choose to “define themselves by their commitment to each other” in order to fulfill “yearnings 
for security, safe haven, and connection that express our common humanity.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584, 2594–600 (2015). 
2  See, e.g, JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 23–4 (1980). 
3  See JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 38 (1979). 
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distinct concepts, argue that the interpretation and application of the law 
must be consistent with a given community’s moral principles.4 
Morality and ethics in analytical jurisprudence have conventionally 
been viewed as a priori standards that are deduced from pure reason5 or 
discoverable by inductive logic.6 In legal discourse, morality remains an 
abstract and indiscriminate concept that is often used as a reference to 
standards of propriety against which human behavior is judged, and as 
Professor Lon Fuller specified, would include various benchmarks such as 
one’s “inner voice of conscience, notions of right and wrong based on 
religious belief, common conceptions of decency and fair play, [and] 
culturally conditioned prejudices.”7 Among legal circles, the word 
“morality” is seldom taken to mean more than a postulated philosophical 
and theoretical standard for evaluating human conduct.8 
The fact that morality takes on a metaphysical character in legal 
discourse has never been considered a problem as the study of law and 
legal institutions in analytical jurisprudence itself relies on conceptual 
analyses as the principal method of analysis.9 And one cannot fault the 
discipline for its lack of a clearer definition or analytical tools to provide 
                                                
4 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 1 (1986) (“There is inevitably a moral dimension to an 
action in law”). See also RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW 2 (1996) (discussing a law against 
pornography, for example, must be read in relation to the moral principle that it is wrong for the state to 
sensor speech).  
5  PAUL GUYER, KANT 212–14 (Brian Leiter ed., 2006) (discussing Kant’s conception of the 
highest good to “preserve and promote human freedom and thereby to treat ourselves and others always 
as ends and never merely as means” is consistent with the observation of moral laws. To Kant, for moral 
laws to have binding force, the realization of the highest good must be possible. However, for the 
highest good to be possible “we must suppose that both immortality and the existence of God (the 
‘highest original good’) are actual. The possibility of the binding force of the supreme principle of 
morality, as a moral command, thus requires us to believe in the truth of certain theoretical propositions, 
that is, assertions of the existence of some object or state of affairs, even though those theoretical 
propositions can have no theoretical proof.”). 
6  JOHN S. MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE, BEING A CONNECTED 
VIEW OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND THE METHODS OF SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATION 519–22 
(rejecting theoretical search for morality and introducing in place inductive reasoning marked by human 
experience). 
7  Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law - A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 
630, 635 (1958). 
8  Michael J. Perry, What is “Morality Anyway?”, 45 VILL. L. REV. 69, 72 (2000). 
9  See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 7, 97–107, 181, 207 (1961) (explaining that the most 
influential figure in twentieth-century jurisprudence, Professor H.L.A. Hart, is often credited for the 
philosophizing of law as a concept, bridging the gap between legal thought and deep philosophical 
study, and elevating practical thinking about law to a specialized discipline of analytic philosophy 
through his work. The concepts of duty, obligation, authority, rules, and moral enforceability were 
analyzed without recourse to any empirical inquiry or descriptive theories - although ironically, 
Professor Hart introduces his book The Concept of Law as “an essay in descriptive sociology.”). See 
also Frederick Schauer, (Re)Taking Hart, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 852, 857–62 (2006) (crediting Hart for 
contemporary tendencies to “equate jurisprudence with the philosophy of law” and for “making 
jurisprudence a subject for philosophers” as Hart developed “his own jurisprudence in a way that 
preserved a philosophical distinctiveness reflecting the conceptual analytic style of 1940s, 1950s, and 
1960s Oxford philosophy.”). See also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized 
Jurisprudence, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 267, 270 (1997) (noting that mainstream Anglo-American jurisprudence 
– “the tradition running from Bentham and Austin in the nineteenth century, to Dworkin and Raz in the 
present” – have been impervious to the influence of Legal Realism as a descriptive (rather than 
conceptual) claim about the law because of Hart’s “devastating critique of the Realists in Chapter VII of 
The Concept of Law [which in turn] rendered Realism a philosophical joke in the English-speaking 
world.”).  
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morality as a concept more tangible meaning when the discipline itself 
draws primarily from the social sciences and humanities10, academic 
disciplines whose own view of morality are predominantly based on the 
moral philosopher’s long-held belief that empirical science is irrelevant, 
and even dangerous, to one’s understanding of moral philosophy.11 In more 
recent years, however, moral philosophers have begun to draw lessons from 
cognitive psychology, neuroscience, and evolutionary biology to study, 
understand, and address philosophical questions.12 This trend towards 
collaboration between psychologists and biologists with philosophers has 
been especially strong in the fields of ethics and moral philosophy13 and has 
generated significant, albeit still exploratory, insights into our moral 
psychology.14 
This naturalistic turn in philosophy, symbolized by the collaboration 
among moral philosophers and natural scientists, has produced new 
methodological15 and ontological16 approaches to the study of morality and 
                                                
10 Howell E. Johnson, Analytical Methods for Lawyers, 53 J. OF LEGAL EDUCATION 321 
(September 2003) (commenting on how pedagogical emphasis in law schools has not changed for over 
a century even though curricular offerings have expanded. Teaching law has, according to Professor 
Johnson, continued to be “on careful parsing of authoritative texts supplemented, depending on the 
teacher’s predilections, with argumentation based on an array of academic disciplines drawn principally 
from the social sciences and humanities.”) (emphasis added).  
11  See WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, Introduction to MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (VOLUME 1) THE 
EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS xiii (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008) 
(attributing this rift to Professor G.E. Moore’s diatribe against the naturalistic fallacy). See also F.S.C. 
Northrop, Law, Language, and Morals, 71 YALE L. J. 1017, 1023–24 (1962) (explaining that the 
naturalistic fallacy consists of the notion that non-empirical and evaluative conclusions cannot be drawn 
from factual and natural premises. Hence, the word “good” as an evaluative term cannot be reduced to 
empirical psychological states such as “pleasure” or “pain.” To do so would be to commit the 
naturalistic fallacy.). Compare G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 90 (Thomas Baldwin ed., 1993), and 
DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 245–46 (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., 1874) 
(supporting that Moore’s naturalistic fallacy is closely related to David Hume’s claim that statements 
about what ought to be normatively cannot be derived from statements about what is empirically, 
known among philosophers as the “is-ought problem.”).  
12  Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 11, at xiii (dating this trend towards collaboration between 
philosophy and the sciences to have started around the 1990s). See also Leiter, supra note 9, at 286–88 
(noting that naturalism in philosophy, wherein philosophical problems are considered better solved 
through empirical theories than a priori “armchair methods” of philosophizing, grew in the second half 
and gained prominence in the last quarter of the 20th century). 
13  Sinnott-Armstrong, supra note 11, at xiii (explaining other areas of philosophy besides 
ethics and moral philosophy, which have seen this trend towards collaboration are the philosophy of 
mind, epistemology, and the philosophy of science). 
14  See, e.g., Joshua D. Greene, The Rise of Moral Cognition, 135 Cognition 39-42 (2015) 
(providing an overview of studies and research on moral cognition and speculating on the direction that 
work will take). 
15  Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 Va. 
L. Rev. 1491, 1497 (2001) (stating that the methodological commitment by naturalists is a philosophical 
inquiry that is “continuous with a posteriori inquiry in the empirical sciences” because of their view that 
“philosophy cannot be an exclusively a priori discipline.” This could mean, per the view of Professor 
W.V.O. Quine, that the empirical sciences should replace philosophy or that empirical facts should limit 
philosophical theorizing per the view of Professor Alvin I. Goldman). See also Owen Flanagan, Hagop 
Sarkissian & David Wong, Naturalizing Ethics, in Moral Psychology (Volume 1) The Evolution of 
Morality: Adaptations and Innateness, supra note 11, at 5 (“claims of ethical naturalism cannot be 
shielded from empirical testing … the naturalist is committed to there being no sharp distinction 
between her investigation and those of relevant other disciplines (particularly between epistemology 
and psychology). In other words, ethical science must be continuous with other sciences.”). 
16  Flanagan, Sarkissian &Wong, supra note 15, at 5 (explaining the ontological commitments 
of the naturalist is an opposition to a belief in the supernatural (as opposed to the natural) and various 
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ethics. By studying morality against the backdrop of research in evolution, 
genetics, and neuroscience, for example, scientists now believe that certain 
moral norms that are widely considered to be immutable and universal, 
such as the moral norm that it is wrong to cheat on an exam, are 
engendered by automatic brain-triggered emotional responses, such as fear, 
disgust, and guilt, which have been internalized by people over time.17 
Scientists have also discovered that a person’s ability to apply social 
knowledge to make appropriate moral decisions in public settings is 
controlled by the orbitofrontal cortex, the same part of the brain that 
controls decision-making, and that people who display inappropriate 
emotional responses in social settings have an orbitofrontal cortex that has 
been neurologically damaged.18 Such research findings from empirical 
testing of moral norms and moral decision-making contiguously with the 
natural sciences could indicate that there might be a level of ubiquity 
among certain moral norms. Since the appropriate moral responses to a 
given social situation appear to be a condition of healthy brain functions,19 
morality might actually be biologically and neurologically demonstrated to 
exist as a matter of objective fact.  
Yet, other branches of the natural sciences, such as cognitive science, 
suggest that moral decisions and moral actions are simply manifestations of 
our emotional frames and that these emotions, which give rise to moral 
decisions and moral actions, do not necessarily track objective aspects of 
reality. Our moral reactions are rather emotional predispositions to various 
situations that confront us, and these subjective reactions ultimately lead 
towards moral relativism. If moral decisions and moral actions are a 
product of our subjective emotional states, morality as a whole lacks 
objective truth and would therefore be unique to communities, socially 
                                                                                                             
forms of ontological dualism, such as the “sharp bifurcation of humans and the rest of the natural world 
as well as mind-body dualism.”).  
17  It seems that the shape human societies take depends a lot on human biology. The limbic 
structures of the human brain provide the physical circuitry for our emotional responses to our 
environment. These structures work with the prefrontal lobe to attach certain emotions to specific 
behaviors. When an individual does something that is morally wrong, the prefrontal lobe evaluates the 
facts and checks them against a particular set of emotions that are internalized over a period of time. See 
LAURENCE TANCREDI, HARDWIRED BEHAVIOR: WHAT NEUROSCIENCE REVEALS ABOUT MORALITY 6–7 
(2005). 
18  MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, RICHARD B. IVRY & GEORGE R. MANGUN, COGNITIVE 
NEUROSCIENCE, THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 593–95 (2014) (describing studies where patients with 
damage to their orbitofrontal cortex were unable to connect with the appropriate social responses that 
would make them aware that their actual behavior violated certain social or moral norms. For example, 
studies in cognitive neuroscience have shown that patients with orbitofrontal cortex damage were likely 
to introduce impolite conversation topics involving emotional and personal information in social 
interactions.). 
19  MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, THE ETHICAL BRAIN: THE SCIENCE OF OUR MORAL DILEMMAS 
167 (2005) (“It has been found that regions of the brain normally active in emotional processing are 
activated with one kind of moral judgment but not another. Arguments that have raged for centuries 
about the nature of moral decisions and their sameness or difference are now quickly and distinctly 
resolved with modern brain imaging. The short form of the new results suggests that when someone is 
willing to act on a moral belief, it is because the emotional part of his or her brain has become active 
when considering the moral question at hand. Similarly, when a morally equivalent problem is 
presented that he or she decides not to act on, it is because the emotional part of the brain does not 
become active. This is a stunning development in human knowledge because it points the way forward 
figuring out how the brain's automatic response may predict out moral response.”). 
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constructed, and produce pluralistic societies.20 Other studies on heuristic 
science also suggest that morality could be socially and culturally 
contingent in that simple heuristics can have significant influence on moral 
decisions and moral actions.21 Default rules in a legal system, such as the 
rule that citizens are presumed to have consented to be organ donors unless 
they opt out of being one, may produce extraordinary differences in moral 
beliefs and social outlooks in given societies.22 As more psychologists 
devote research efforts to understanding the ways in which people make 
judgements under uncertain circumstances using heuristics instead of more 
complex principles to assess probability and risks or predict values, the 
theory of rational judgement and the traditional conception of morality as a 
rational, impartial constraint on the pursuit of personal self-interest 
becomes questionable.23 Consequentially, morality would lack an objective 
foundation. 
These studies into our moral psyche and their resulting empirical 
findings have important consequences for analytical jurisprudence, which 
for the purposes of this article, is the study of the metaphysical foundations 
of the law where the primary concern of the analyst is the nature of law and 
the overarching question of “What Is Law?”.24 As the analytical jurist aims 
to identify criteria that establish specific attributes of a normative system 
                                                
20  JESSE J. PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS 23–25 (2007) (discussing the 
time-honored trolley problem in philosophical discourse and theorizing that in deliberating moral 
dilemmas, we often pit one set of emotions against other sets of other emotions with the “stronger” 
emotions eventually winning out such that moral intuitions about moral problems can be changed by 
altering the scenarios in emotionally significant ways. For example, by telling subjects who are going to 
pull the lever that the one person, who is going to be killed to save the five others, is closer to the 
subject than the other five, the subject may be more willing to save the one and sacrifice the five even 
though subjects have conventionally chosen to sacrifice the one to save the five.). 
21  Simple heuristics are processes of decision making in which human minds make quick 
decisions and inferences with limited time and knowledge. This form of decision making based on a 
model of bounded rationality allows the mind to make quick decisions without having to compute 
probabilities and utilities in the decision-making process. See Gerd Gigerenzer & Peter M. Todd, Fast 
and Frugal Heuristics: The Adaptive Tool Box, SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 6 (2001). 
22    Gerd Gigerenzer, Moral Intuition = Fast and Frugal Heuristics, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
(VOLUME 2) THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY: INTUITION AND DIVERSITY 1–3 (Walter Sinnott-
Armstrong ed., 2008) (explaining 99.9% of French and Hungarian citizens are organ donors but only 
28% of Americans and 17% of British citizens choose to be organ donors. Peer pressure, obedience, and 
fear of being punished have been dismissed as being the cause for this discrepancy in statistics. 
Campaigns launched in the U.S. and U.K. to create awareness of the need for organs have also not been 
successful in increasing the general numbers of organ donors. Professor Gerd Gigerenzer attributes the 
discrepancy in numbers to the default rule in these countries. France and Hungary are presumed consent 
countries, where everyone is a donor unless they opt out, and U.S. and U.K. are explicit-consent 
countries, where no one is a donor unless they opt in.).  
23  DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT, 4-17 (1986).  
24  SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 3 (2011) (explaining that analytical jurisprudence tries to 
provide an account of how law differs from other normative systems). “Analytical jurisprudes want to 
determine the fundamental nature of [objects such as legal systems, law, rules, rights, authority, validity, 
obligation, interpretation, sovereignty, courts, proximate causation, property, crime, tort, negligence, 
and so on] by asking analytical questions such as: What distinguishes legal systems from games, 
etiquette, and religion? Are all laws rules? Are legal rights a type of moral right? Is legal reasoning a 
special kind of reasoning? Is legal causation the same as ordinary, everyday causation? Is property best 
understood as a bundle of rights? What distinguishes tort from crime? And so on.” Answering the 
analytical question of “What Is Law?” has significant impact on how law is understood and practiced in 
specific settings because “what the law is in any particular case depends critically on the answer to 
what the law is in general.” Id. at 25.   
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which would qualify it as a system of law and distinguish it from other 
normative systems, such as religion or ethics,25 morality has a fundamental 
place in that understanding of the concept of law.26 Morality is essential to a 
law’s validity in that legal content must conform to moral norms before 
they can be considered valid and binding laws.27 The normative force of 
law, from the natural lawyer’s point of view, comes from the law’s 
conformity to moral norms because it is only then that law would be 
capable of binding the conscience of its subjects and commanding  
obedience.28 Furthermore, despite legal positivism’s prima facie 
commitment to the separability thesis and the separation of laws and 
morals,29 to an exclusive legal positivist, law and morality are necessarily 
connected in an important way in that law can only govern with legitimate 
authority and provide individuals with reasons for acting when it places 
itself in the service of morality.30 
As the question central to analytical jurisprudence about the nature of 
law is important in helping us resolve practical and specific questions about 
legal practice and legal interpretation,31 this paper leaves the question 
“What Is Law?” intact as it evaluates how the naturalization of  ethics will 
change the discourse about the nature of law in analytical jurisprudence. 
Thus, while this paper looks at the naturalistic turn in moral philosophy and 
                                                
25  Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 549, 557 (1993) (“Typically, analytic jurisprudence has an important normative component: It 
aims to set out the conditions that must be satisfied in order for something to count as law. It is 
normative with regard to the conditions for applying the concept; it is not normative in the sense of 
setting out the conditions that must be satisfied in order that legal practice be justified.”). 
26  See Jules L. Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, 121 YALE L. J. 2 (2011). To the 
natural lawyer, morality is essential to the very nature of law and provides laws with the authority to 
“bind the conscience” of people. Id. at 18. To exclusive positivism, which considers only social (and not 
evaluative or moral) facts as determinative of legal content, law and morality are still necessarily 
connected in a different yet important way. Although morality is not essential in determining the content 
of law and exists outside of the law, morality nevertheless encompasses the law and incorporates it in 
that morality will determine the law’s place by ensuring that it’s the law’s specific place to serve and 
pursue moral aims. As Professor Coleman states it,“[n]ecessarily, law is an instrument in the service of 
morality.” Id. at 52–53. 
27  SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, VOLUME 1: A 
FACSIMILE OF THE FIRST EDITION OF 1765-1769, 40-42 (The Uni. Of Chicago Press 1979). 
28  See Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. 
REV. 630, 660–61 (1958) (“But I think it demonstrable that the most serious deterioration in legal 
morality under Hitler took place in branches of the law like those involved in the informer cases; no 
comparable deterioration was to be observed in the ordinary branches of private law. It was in those 
areas where the ends of law were most odious by ordinary standards of decency that the morality of law 
itself was most flagrantly disregarded. In other words, where one would have been most tempted to say, 
‘This is so evil it cannot be a law,’ one could usually have said instead, ‘This thing is the product of a 
system so oblivious to the morality of law that it is not entitled to be called a law.’ I think there is 
something more than accident here, for the overlapping suggests that legal morality cannot live when it 
is severed from a striving toward justice and decency.”). 
29  See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 140–41 
(1982).  
30  Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, supra note 26, at 49 (“one should act on the 
basis of the law’s reasons only when morality counsels that one do so … acting on the basis of the law’s 
directives is required by morality only when doing so ‘serves’ morality that is, makes it more likely that 
one will conform to the requirements of morality than one otherwise would. Law serves morality 
insofar as it creates new moral reasons for acting, identifies the action called for by the balance of 
reasons, or makes concrete, in a given set of circumstances, what morality requires. To the extent that 
law serves morality, morality provides a place for law.”). 
31  SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 24, at 25–30. 
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its effect on the question of what law is, this paper is not concerned with 
the question of whether jurisprudence as the philosophical study of law 
should be naturalized to focus on the realities of legal practice and whether 
or not legal realism as a naturalized theory of law might be a suitable 
candidate for serious legal philosophy.32 Instead, the focus of this project is 
the effect naturalized ethics has on the concept of law central to analytical 
jurisprudence. The examination of morality in this paper is also less 
concerned with the ontology of morality as socially existing moral facts 
and is more concerned with the method of explaining the existence of 
moral facts and moral knowledge through empirical research on our moral 
psychology in the natural sciences.  
This paper is structured to explain the place and significance of 
morality in natural law and exclusive legal positivism, examine research 
findings about our moral psychology, and evaluate what these findings 
mean for the discourse about law and morality and by extension, about the 
concept of law, in analytical jurisprudence. Thus, Part 1 of this paper lays 
out the natural lawyer’s and exclusive legal positivist’s response to the 
question of whether law and morality are necessarily connected and how 
that connection most importantly provides laws with their validity or 
legitimacy. Part 2 examines studies on our moral psychology in the fields 
of evolutionary biology, cognitive science, and neuroscience which tend to 
suggest that moral knowledge and moral facts are socially constructed and 
subject to various biases and heuristics. Some research findings, such as the 
finding that disruption to the right temporoparietal junction affects an 
individual’s ability to ascribe moral blame for a perpetrator who intends to 
cause but fails to cause harm,33 would however suggest that there is some 
degree of objectivity and ubiquity to certain forms of moral expectations 
that are necessitated by undisturbed brain functions. Part 3 evaluates how 
these studies into our moral psychology affect the concepts of legal validity 
and legitimacy. 
II.  PART 1: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN LAW AND MORALITY 
Morality and law are alike in many ways.34 Laws and morals both share 
similar vocabularies that emphasize core concepts of rights and duties that 
provide personal freedom and impose social responsibilities and 
obligations.35 Yet, the renowned legal positivist, Professor H.L.A. Hart, saw 
the “many different relations between law and morals” and stressed that 
                                                
32  Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. 
REV. 267, 275 (1997) (arguing that legal realists have laid the foundation for a “naturalized 
jurisprudence predicated on a pragmatic outlook”). 
33  Liane Young, Joan Albert Camprodon, Marc Hauser, Alvaro Pascual-Leone & Rebecca 
Saxe, Disruption of the Right Temporoparietal Junction with Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation 
Reduces the Role of Beliefs in Moral Judgments, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. no.15 6753 (2010) 
(showing that disruption to the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), an area involved in mental state 
reasoning, by magnetic stimulation affects an individual’s ability to consider the mental state of a 
perpetrator in making judgements about perpetrators who intended but failed to do harm). 
34  Robin Bradley Kar, The Deep Structure of Law and Morality, 84 TEX. L. REV. 877 (2006). 
35 See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 7 (1978).  
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despite these connections between law and morality, there was “nothing 
that can be profitably singled out as the relation between them.”36 
Jurisprudence, as it were, was and still is treated as a separate discipline 
from moral philosophy and ethics.37 Law was considered identifiable by 
purely social facts alone38 and can be analyzed by studying actual legal 
institutions and legal rules without the need to deduce legal precepts from 
normative ideals or metaphysical first principles. 39  Analytical 
jurisprudence, in particular, distanced itself from the disciplined study of 
theoretical and normative ethics and focused instead on essentially 
conceptual and descriptive theories of law that were cordoned off from 
moral inquiries.40 
One can ponder if Professor Hart’s claim that there is “nothing which 
can be profitably singled out for study as the relation” between law and 
morality really holds true. Many legal scholars juxtapose the iniquity seen 
in contemporary society against natural law principles that emphasize 
ultimate human good which is safeguarded through positive law. Positive 
laws that fall short of fundamental ideals in natural law, such as the rule of 
law, the inalienable rights of individuals, and the endeavor to seek 
social/economic justice, draw attention to the tyrannical governments and 
governmental abuses of power, which resulted in such laws and the impact 
of such laws on the fundamental liberties and natural rights of individuals. 
For example, after World War II, we see Gustav Radbruch asserting that 
Nazi statutes that deprived ordinary citizens in Germany the basic quality 
of life and justice, which all legal systems governed by the rule of law 
should protect, could not be considered proper laws because the inequities 
of these statutes caused them to deviate from “the very nature of law.”41 
Despite Radbruch’s well-known pre-World War II commitment to legal 
positivism and the idea that legal and moral analyses, like empirical and 
normative inquiries, are distinctive methodologies that must be kept 
separated, Radbruch nonetheless turned to natural law teachings to 
highlight how far Nazi laws fell from the ideal standard for legal rules.42 
Martin Luther King, Jr., in his “Letter from a Birmingham Jail,” written 
when he was imprisoned for nonviolent demonstrations against 
segregation, also sought to highlight the iniquities of racial segregation in 
the South by arguing that the false senses of superiority for the segregator 
and inferiority for the segregated created by segregation laws produce 
injustices and should be disobeyed because they are “morally wrong.”43 
                                                
36  Id. at 181.  
37  JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAW, MORALS, AND POLITICAL TRIALS 2–3 (1986). 
38  JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 310 (2009). 
39  ROSCOE POUND, LAW AND MORALS 43–44 (1969). 
40  JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 276-80 (1832). 
41  CARLO FOCARELLI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS SOCIAL CONSTRUCT: THE STRUGGLE FOR 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 30 n.59 (2012). 
42  Thomas Gil, Gustav Radbruch, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 713–14 
(Christopher Berry Gray, ed., 1999). 
43  Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from a Birmingham Jail, in PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS IN 
THE LAW 78–82 (David M. Adams ed., 2005) (“an unjust law is a human law that is not rooted in eternal 
and natural law. Any law that uplifts human personality is just. Any law that degrades human 
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This is a distinct natural law view that considers a rule compliant with 
moral standards a valid rule and therefore a justified rule that one must 
observe, endorse and obey.44 Hence when a law is morally defective, it is 
not justified and thus should not be obeyed.  
 The connection between law and morality in analytical 
jurisprudence should not be underestimated. To natural lawyers, the 
creation of positive law by the law-maker must be in accordance with an 
order that is congruous with “free choice, practical reasoning and morality” 
so that laws that are eventually passed are for the sake of the common 
good.45 To legal positivists who reject the proposition that morality be used 
to set standards for the law and that law be oriented only towards the 
virtues of truth and clarity, which Professor Hart saw as the “sovereign 
virtue in jurisprudence,”46 morality is still relevant to the concept of law 
albeit in a slightly different context from that of the natural lawyer. To the 
legal positivist, the view that social—and not moral—facts contribute to 
legal content does not necessarily suggest that the social facts that we 
choose to identify a law with will not make that law conform to specific  
moral standards. As Professor Joseph Raz states it, “[t]he claim that what is 
law and what is not is purely a matter of social fact still leaves it an open 
question whether or not those social facts by which we identify the law or 
determine its existence do or do not endow it with moral merit.”47 In this 
sense, even if law does not incorporate morality as legal content as the 
natural lawyer would have it, morality would nevertheless incorporate the 
law and provide us with sound reasons to act on the law’s directives or 
commands.48 
A.  NATURAL LAW AND LEGAL VALIDITY 
Natural law provides the first stage of moral evaluation of a law in 
analytical jurisprudence. The assessment of the relationship between law 
and morality and the moral evaluation of law with natural law occur at a 
rudimentary level, where the focus of legal inquiry is whether a social rule 
may properly be called a law when that rule is inherently immoral. For 
natural lawyers, the creation of a rule and the establishment of a systems of 
rules must be intrinsically moral.49 Besides setting an aspiration of what 
                                                                                                             
personality is unjust. All segregation statutes are unjust because segregation distorts the soul and 
damages the personality.”).  
44  RAZ, supra note 3, at 150 (stating that natural lawyers adopt the view that “a valid rule” 
means a justified one, a rule that one is justified, indeed required, to observe and endorse”). 
45  Robert George, Natural Law and Positive Law, in COMMON TRUTHS: NEW PERSPECTIVES 
ON NATURAL LAW 164 (Howard B. McLean ed., 2000). 
46  Leslie Green, Positivism and the Inseparability of Laws and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1035, 1037 (2008). 
47  RAZ, supra note 44, at 38–39 (Professor Raz goes on to say, “[i]f they do, it has of necessity 
a moral character. But even if they do not, it is still an open question whether, given human nature and 
the general condition of human existence, every legal system which is in fact the effective law of some 
society does of necessity conform to some moral values and ideals,” indicating that positive laws will 
often satisfy moral standards even if morality is not necessarily incorporated into those laws themselves 
as legal content).  
48  Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, supra note 26, at 49. 
49  LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 41–43 (1964). 
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good laws should look like,50 natural law also insists that the rule in itself 
must be moral.51 A rule that does not have a moral purpose thus fails as a 
legal rule. When a rule fails as a legal rule by natural law standards, the 
rule will not be treated as a valid rule of law and cannot have normative 
force to give rise to a legal or moral duty to obey it because its deficiency 
in morality deprives it of a reason for action.52 Furthermore, a judge who 
applies or enforces an unjust law and contradicts the natural law 
requirement that valid laws be essentially moral may be considered to be 
acting unlawfully and culpable of wrongdoing when he applied or enforced 
an invalid law.53  
From the vantage point of classical natural law theory, as expounded by 
Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas, morality and law are both 
intrinsically entwined. Law, by its very nature, embodies an essential moral 
force that cannot be expelled if a rule is to be properly called a valid law 
and be legally binding.54 To the classical natural law theorist, law concerns 
itself with the common good of society; its primary interests would be in its 
community’s well-being. Therefore, because law provided reasons for 
action, law was thus seen as “an ordination of reason for the common 
good.”55 To be a valid and legally binding law, a legal rule must conform to 
right reason and seek justice because, as Aquinas viewed it, an “unjust law 
                                                
50  Id. at 41 (Professor Lon Fuller calls this place of perfect legal system a “utopia of legality” 
wherein “all rules are perfectly clear, consistent with one another, known to every citizen, never 
retroactive … constant through time, demand only what is possible, and are scrupulously observed by 
courts, police, and everyone else charged with their administration”). 
51  Classical natural law conceived by early thinkers such as Aquinas puts forth these 
propositions: 
that law establishes reasons for action; 
that its rules can and presumptively (defeasibly) do create moral obligations that did not 
existing of the rules; 
that that kind of legal-moral obligation is defeated by a posited rule’s serious immorality or 
injustice; and 
that judicial and other paradigmatically legal deliberation, reasoning, and judgement 
includes, concurrently, both natural (moral) and (purely) positive law. 
John Finnis, Natural Law Theories, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/natural-law-theories, (last revised Nov. 4, 2015). 
52  Id. (“since justice is the very point of having and respecting law at all, this particular law’s 
deficiency in justice deprives it of the decisive significance which all laws purports to have. It is thus 
law only in a sense that should be judged - especially when law is regarded, as by Hart himself, as a 
kind of reason or purported reason for action - to be a distorted and secondary non-central sense.”). 
53  Translation of the Court of Appeal’s Grudge Informer Case, in David Dyzenhaus, The 
Grudge Informer Case Revisited, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1000, 1033–34 (2008) (The Bamberg Court of 
Appeal opined obiter that laws which prescribed an affirmative conduct prohibited by “divine or human 
law in the opinion of all civilized nations” violated the laws of nature and compelled the “inference that 
the judge that applies them acts unlawfully himself and is thus culpable.”).  
54  Professor Raz explains the normative effect of a valid rule: “A legally valid rule is one which 
has legal effects. To avoid misunderstanding, these statements should perhaps be augmented to read: A 
legally valid rule is one which has the normative effects (in law) which it claims to have. If it is a legal 
rule purporting to impose and obligation on X then X is under this obligation because the rule is a legal 
rule. It is a rule purporting to confer a right or a power on Y then Y has the right or power in virtue of 
the fact that the rule is a legal rule.” RAZ, supra note 44, at 149. 
55  ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS 46 (Paul E. Sigmund ed., & trans., W. W. 
Norton & Co., Inc. 1998). 
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... does not have the character of law but rather that of an act of violence.”56 
St. Augustine goes a step further and asserted that “a law that is unjust is 
considered to be no law at all.”57 Justice, therefore, is an essential 
component of law to natural lawyers, as is morality. For classical natural 
law theory, therefore, good morals, when established by right reason in 
men, will inspire men to act for the common good. Laws passed in the 
pursuit of the common good will embody the virtues of justice and morality 
and will therefore be valid laws with normative effect.58 Where classical 
natural lawyers looked to divine guidance for human judgment in the law-
making process,59 contemporary natural lawyers have relied less on the 
divine to set their moral benchmark. Instead, they replaced external 
guidance from the divine with an internalized form of practical 
reasonableness encapsulating man’s innate capacity to reason, distinguish 
right from wrong, and choose the right course of action.60 Professor Fuller, 
for example, offered the two moralities of duty and aspiration to 
demonstrate what a “utopia of legality” and the law’s “inner morality,” as a 
benchmark of the perfect law and legal system, would look like.61 In a 
similar fashion, Professor John Finnis has insisted that laws must uphold 
moral values and principles62 but instead of deriving these moral principles 
and values from the eternal law, he identified them through “objective [or 
practical] reasonableness”63 and chose them as valuable goods which 
ultimately support humanity’s well-being.64 
The significance of morality—whether derived from divine or eternal 
law or discovered through practical reason—in natural law theory is that 
law’s conformity with morality justifies the obligations and duties that law 
impose and provides a reason for action that would not exist but for the 
                                                
56  Id. at 48. Professor Finnis notes that classical political theory often draws a distinction 
between “central and perverted or otherwise marginal instances of an analytical concept or term.” Thus, 
Professor Finnis notes that Aquinas “never says simply “unjust law is not law” but rather “unjust law is 
not straightforwardly or unqualifiedly [simpliciter] law” or “is a perversion of law,” and similar 
statements.” Finnis, Natural Law Theories, supra note 51. 
57  ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS, supra note 55, at 53 (citing St. Augustine, 
On Free Choice, I, 5). The assertion “a law that is unjust is considered to be no law at all” might be a 
slogan-form locution about the law in short-hand. Finnis, Natural Law Theories, supra note 51. 
58  ST. THOMAS AQUINAS ON POLITICS AND ETHICS, supra note 55, at 58 (“Since human moral 
conduct is directed by reason which is the basic principle of human action, those moral actions that are 
in accord with reason are called good, and those that depart from reason are called evil.”). 
59  Patrick McKinley Brennan, Law, Natural Law, and Human Intelligence, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 
731, 741–43 (2006) (“According to the classical position, in promulgating the natural law, the divine 
legislator works through human nature itself; our participation in the eternal law occurs through our 
given natures.”).  
60  George, Natural Law and Positive Law, supra note 45, at 154 (“the role of moral norma in 
practical reasoning is captures in the tradition of natural law theorizing by the notion of recta ratio - 
“right reason.” Right reason is reason unfettered by emotional or other impediments to choosing 
consistently with what reason fully requires.”). 
61  FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, supra note 49, at 39–42 (1964). To Professor Fuller, the 
morality of aspiration is most “plainly exemplified in Greek philosophy. It is the morality of the Good 
Life, of excellence, of the fullest realization of human powers,.” The morality of duty, on the other 
hand, “lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or without which an 
ordered society directed toward certain specific goal will fail its mark.” Id. at 5–6. 
62  JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 290 (1980). 
63  Id. 
64  Id. at 100–03. 
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law. If individuals are required to be law-abiding for the sake of the 
common good, but where an act, such as the duty to pay taxes to the 
government, is stipulated by law to be obligatory, the only way to be law-
abiding is to perform the obligatory act, i.e., pay the government taxes that 
it imposes, as stipulated by the law. Thus, we need to do the act stipulated 
by the law—pay the government taxes—when the act—the duty to pay the 
government taxes—has been legally stipulated to be obligatory.65 The law, 
when justified according to morality, provides us with a reason to abide by 
these tax laws and willingly surrender money to the government so that at 
the end of the day, we may realize for ourselves things, such as national 
defense and accessible healthcare, which we would never have been able to 
realize for ourselves without the law making it obligatory for us to pay the 
government taxes.  
In natural law theory, these laws with the common good as ends, are 
necessary to coordinate social behavior and attain group cohesiveness by 
compelling the “recalcitrant citizen” through sanctions and giving the law-
abiding citizen “special conclusory force” to their practical reasoning to act 
for the common good.66 Thus positive laws are essential to any society, 
whether that society be formed by communities of robbers or saints.67 
Morality, to the natural lawyer, seeks, strives for, and preserves the 
common good by compelling the enactment and enforcement of positive 
law through the institutions of political government. The natural lawyer 
would consider positive law that is not in harmony with morality’s demand 
for justice, equality, and fairness invalid and thereby incapable of binding 
the conscience of people. These people who are the subject of such a law 
will not be under an obligation to abide by it.68  
                                                
65  Professor Finnis explains the schema for understanding the schema for justifying obligation-
imposing legal rules in this simplified form: 
We need, for the sake of the common good, to be law abiding;  
But where  is stipulated by law to be obligatory, the only way to be law-abiding is to do 
; 
Therefore, we need [it is obligatory for us] to do  where  has been legally stipulated to 
be obligatory.  
FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 62, at 316. 
66  Id. at 317–18 (“the formulae expressive of legal obligation have their specific intelligibility 
from the fact that they are self-consciously designed not only to fit the recalcitrant citizen’s sanction-
dominated practical reasonings, but also and most characteristically to fit into and to give special 
conclusory force to the practical reasonings of those who see and are generally willing to act upon the 
need (for the common good) for authority.”).  
67  George, Natural Law and Positive Law, supra note 45, at 160 (“It is tempting to think of 
authority and law as necessary only because of human malice, selfishness, inconsistency, weakness, or 
intransigence. The truth, however, is that law would be necessary to coordinate the behavior of 
members of the community for the sake of the common good even in a society of saints. Of course, in 
such a society legal sanctions - the threat of punishment for law-breaking would be unnecessary; but 
laws themselves would still be needed. Given that no earthly society is a society of saints, legal 
sanctions are - quite reasonably - universal features of a legal system. They are not, however, essential 
to the concept of law.”).  
68  See, e.g., SIR LESLIE STEPHENS, THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS 143 (1882) (“If a legislature 
decided all blue-eyed babies should be murdered, the preservation of blue-eyed babies would be illegal; 
but legislators must go mad before they would pass such a law, and subjects be idiotic before they could 
submit to it”). Thus, even if a legislature were to pass a law requiring that all blue-eyed babies be 
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B.  EXCLUSIVE LEGAL POSITIVISM AND LEGITIMACY  
While natural law theory focused on morality as the essential 
component in the concept of law that makes laws binding and provides 
people with reason for action,69 legal positivism focused instead on purely 
social facts to describe the concept of law. In legal positivism, the social 
thesis prescribes that what the law is is a matter of social fact and that 
morals, which to the natural lawyer provide law with its normative force, 
are not essential for a social rule to be called law.70 To a legal positivist, 
rules become laws by “the activities of human beings” and not because 
morality determined that a rule satisfied the demands of justice or 
fairness.71 A law’s moral worth does not depend on conformity to basic 
moral norms but is instead dependent on it’s society's moral conditions. 
Thus, normative decisions about the appropriate legal content for specific 
laws is usually left to the legislature (as the branch of government that 
posits laws) and these policy decisions would seldom be questioned by the 
courts particularly if the legislature acts within its constitutional authority.72  
Legal positivism’s commitment to the separation of law and morality is 
an acknowledgment of the fact that many laws that are passed today are 
sometimes inherently immoral in the unfairness and injustice they produce 
but the legal positivist would not come close to suggesting that these laws 
are invalid and non-binding laws as a natural lawyer would.73 In fact, many 
                                                                                                             
murdered, that law may still be “law” (in that it was passed by the legislature) but it would be a law 
that, in the words of Aquinas, “does not have the force of law,” absolving all subjects from any duty to 
obey and legal institutions from any duty to enforce that law.). 
69  It is noted that for natural law theory, both social and moral facts make up the concept of 
law. Natural lawyers do not deny the assertion central to legal positivism - that social facts make up the 
concept of law - is one part of the understanding of law. However, for law to be be valid - and legally 
and morally binding on people - it must also satisfy the demands of morality. Thus, as Professor Finnis 
states it, “[n]atural law theory accepts that law can be considered and spoken of both as a sheer social 
fact of power and practice, and a set of reasons for action that can be and often are sound as reasons and 
therefore normative for reasonable people addressed by them.” He also states, “[o]n the one hand, 
natural law theory holds that law’s “source-based character” - its dependence upon social facts such as 
legislation, custom or judicially established precedents - is a fundamental and primary element in “law’s 
capacity to advance the common good, to secure human rights, or to govern with integrity.” On the 
other hand, the question “whether law is of its very nature morally problematic” has from the outset 
been the subject of consideration by leaders of the tradition.” Finnis, Natural Law Theories, supra note 
51. 
70  RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 44, at 37–38 (stating that the social thesis is 
fundamental to legal positivism and that the moral value or moral merit of the law is an inessential 
feature of the concept of law because a law or a legal system’s moral merit would be a “contingent 
matter dependent on the content of the law and the circumstances of the society to which it applies.” 
“Since by the social thesis what is law is a matter social fact, and the identification of law involves no 
moral argument, it follows that conformity to moral values or ideals is in no way a condition for 
anything being a law or legally binding. Hence, the law’s conformity to moral values and ideals is not 
necessary. It is contingent on the particular circumstances of its creation or application. Therefore, as 
the moral thesis has it, the moral merit of the law depends on contingent factors. There can be no 
argument that of necessity that the law has moral merit.”). 
71  Id. 
72  See, e.g., Place v. Norwich & N.Y. Transp. Co., 118 U.S. 468, 495 (1886) (stating that once 
Congress has determined that a legal question is or is not consistent with public policy, the courts are 
not to judge that legal question and Congress’s determination). 
73  Green, supra note 46, at 1041 (“According to the sources thesis … the fact that a certain 
legal rule would be inefficient is no better reason for doubting its existence than the fact that it would be 
inhumane or unjust. John Austin put it this way: “A law, which actually exists, is a law, though we 
 
9 - Ng Book Proof.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/27/17  3:32 PM 
506 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 26:493 
unfair and unjust laws are accepted by the general population and enforced 
as legal rules74 which would be consistent with positivism’s account of law 
as a social and political fact.75 The concept of immoral law, as Professor 
Coleman states it, is not incoherent to legal positivism.76 As many countries 
with a written constitution, such as the United States, determine a law’s 
validity and its normative force by referring to its constitution, which 
would normally lay out the legislature’s authority to pass laws for the 
benefit of the state and its people,77 the significance of morality to the 
concept of law in any practical sense would be watered-down. 
 However, the fact that morality is not essential in determining a law or 
a legal system’s validity in legal positivism does not necessarily mean that 
morality is completely irrelevant to legal positivism. Positivism’s vision of 
the relationship between law and morality is instrumental in nature in that 
law must be seen to serve a moral end even if the law in itself wants moral 
merit.  Professor Coleman separates legal positivism’s response to law’s 
connection to morality into two groups—exclusive legal positivism and 
inclusive legal positivism. Exclusive legal positivism identifies with the 
view that “only social facts determine the content law” and that “[l]aw has 
the content that it does in virtue of facts about individual (or group) 
behavior and attitudes: that is, in virtue of social facts.”78 Inclusive legal 
positivism, on the other hand, identifies with the view that both “normative 
and social facts contribute to legal content. According to this view, what the 
law is—how it is that it has the content that it does—can depend on either 
or both social and as well as normative facts.”79 As inclusive legal 
positivism views morality and social facts as possibly contributing to legal 
content, it entertains the untenable position that for officials, such as 
judges, to be bound by moral considerations, law must incorporate morality 
to make the official bound by it. But as Professor Coleman points out, this 
“attributes to law a power that law simply could not possess. Morality’s 
role in determining what a judge ought to do cannot depend on what the 
law has to say about it.”80 The more tenable view on the connection 
between law and morality is exclusive legal positivism’s view that only 
                                                                                                             
happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate our approbation and 
disapprobation.”). 
74  See, e.g., Kevin R. Johnson, Open Borders?, 51 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 193, 216–17 (2003) 
(documenting immigration laws that authorize racial discrimination and cruelty to non-U.S. citizens at 
the border with spillover effects on U.S. citizens with common ancestry with those excluded). 
75  Roger Berkowitz, Democratic Legitimacy and the Scientific Foundation of Modern Law, 8 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 91, 96 (2007). 
76  Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, supra note 26, at 9. See also, Green, supra note 
46, at 1058 (stating that while “Fuller is interested in the morality that makes law possible; Hart is also 
interested in the immorality that law makes possible.” (emphasis added)). 
77  M’Culloch v. State of Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 326–27 (1819) (“The constitution, therefore, 
declares, that the constitution itself, and the laws passed in pursuance of its provisions, shall be the 
supreme law of the land, and shall control all state legislation and state constitutions, which may be 
incompatible therewith; and it confides to this court the ultimate power of deciding all questions arising 
under the constitution and laws of the United States. The laws of the United States, then, made in 
pursuance of the constitution, are to be the supreme law of the land.”). 
78  Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, supra note 26, at 46–47. 
79  Id. at 47. 
80  Id. at 48. 
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social facts contribute to legal content. This view allows for the 
acknowledgement of valid laws based purely on social facts while 
subjecting officials to moral obligations regardless of the content of the 
law.81 
Since exclusive legal positivism has the more tenable view that 
morality, while external to the content of law, still binds officials, it follows 
from this view that laws cannot incorporate morality internally but must 
instead serve morality in such a way that morality can bind officials who 
apply and enforce the laws of a legal system.82 To exclusive legal 
positivism, morality is an external fact that cannot and does not have any 
effect on the content and validity of laws. Rather, morality is an end which, 
if law serves,83 provides laws with legitimate authority to grant people 
authority and rights under the law and, in a similar vein, impose obligations 
and duties on them.84 The overarching moral premise that legitimizes the 
law’s authority also gives officials of a legal system and people governed 
by the same system practical reasons to act in accordance with the law’s 
directives and orders.85 Legitimacy requires that individuals who are 
subject to the law not only recognize the law as valid; beyond the 
recognition and acceptance of legal rules as valid and binding, these 
individuals must also adopt an attitude that regards the law as morally 
justified (and therefore legitimate) and act according to its directives.86  
In a more recent account of the concept of law, Professor Scott Shapiro 
argues that laws—“the fundamental rules of a legal system”—are plans.87 
While Professor Shapiro recognizes that it is “doubtful … that the social 
facts necessary for the existence of a shared plan will always generate 
                                                
81  Id. at 49.  
82  Id. (stating that because “morality applies regardless of the content of the law, it cannot be 
up to law to determine the nature and scope of morality’s application to action governed by law. If 
anything, rather than law incorporating morality, as the inclusive legal positivist would have it, morality 
“incorporates” law … If we must always do what morality requires us to do, then the only time we 
would he permitted to act on the basis of considerations that appear to be non-moral is when morality 
itself counsels us to do so … acting on the basis of the law’s directives is required by morality only 
when doing so ‘serves’ morality - that is, makes it more likely that one will confirm to the requirements 
of morality than one otherwise would.”). 
83  Id. at 52 (“exclusive legal positivism is the conclusion of an argument that relies on the 
premise that law and morality are necessarily connected in a distinctive way. Here, the idea is that the 
place of law is in general determined by morality, and that specifically its place it to serve morality. 
Necessarily, law is an instrument in the service of morality.”). 
84  A law or a legal system claiming to impose duties and confer rights would only be 
considered to have legitimate authority “only if and to the extent that their claim is justified and they are 
owed a duty of obedience.” Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5 (1985). 
85  Id. at 13 (“The fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its 
performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but 
should exclude and take the place of some of them.”).  
86  It is only when individuals acknowledge that the law has authority over them by accepting 
the directives of the law as having authoritative force that the law’s authority becomes legitimate. As 
Professor Raz states it: “the normal and primary way to establish that a person should be acknowledged 
to have authority over another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely better to 
comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts 
the directives of the alleged authority as authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by 
trying to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.” Id. at 18-19. 
87  SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 24 at 119 (“The existence conditions for law are the same as 
those for plans because the fundamental rules of a legal system are plans.”). 
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morally acceptable legal arrangements,” he is still committed to the 
exclusive legal positivist view that the necessary connection between law 
and morals i..e., that the law’s legitimate authority is dependent on the 
law’s service of a moral aim, provides officials of a legal system with the 
authority to impose moral obligations on people to obey the law88 Another 
way of making the point is to say that the power of officials in a legal 
system to impose moral obligations on people to obey the law does not 
follow from that law’s validity.89 Instead, the power of officials to impose 
on individuals the moral obligation to obey the law stems from a shared 
plan for social governance—the “master plan” in Professor Shapiro’s 
terminology—setting out a “morally legitimate scheme of government.”90 
C.  THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NATURAL LAW AND EXCLUSIVE 
LEGAL POSITIVISM  
Both natural law theory and exclusive legal positivism share one 
feature in their views about the relationship between law and morality. In 
the analysis of the connection between law and morality, natural lawyers 
and exclusive legal positivist believe that there is a necessary connection 
between law and morality. Law and morality are normative orders that 
relate to each other in a significant way. However, natural lawyers and 
exclusive legal positivists see that connection in very different ways. To the 
natural lawyer, the relationship between law and morality is, in part, 
intrinsic. Morality is essential to legal content and the law’s very nature, in 
fact its very validity, is dependent on morality being an intrinsic part of it. 
To the exclusive legal positivist, the relationship between law and morality 
is functional or instrumental and morality exists as an extrinsic feature of 
the legal order. Law, instead of incorporating morality, serves morality.91   
As the exclusive positivist sees the law as working in the service of 
morality, the exclusive legal positivist insists on the separation of law and 
moral in their definition of what law is.92 It is only by keeping moral 
arguments separate from what law is that it would be possible for a legal 
system to correct moral problems in society.93 And for the law to correct 
moral problems in society, it must act with legitimate authority by not 
                                                
88  Id. at 184 (“We might analogize the law to a game. If one has no reason to play a game, one 
has no reason to respect its rules. Likewise, if one has no moral reason to participate in or support a 
particular legal system, one has no moral reason to recognize its demands. As a result, the authorization 
of a master plan and the ability to dispose others to comply cannot by themselves confer moral 
legitimacy on the one authorized. Unless the master plan sets out a morally legitimate scheme of 
governance, those authorized will merely enjoy legal authority but will lack the ability to impose moral 
obligations to obey”) (emphasis added).  
89  Id. at 188 (“legal authority does not entail the power to impose moral obligations to obey 
and hence does not require the approval of principles of political morality”). 
90  Id. at 184. 
91  Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, supra note 26 at 55 (“Whereas both are 
committed to necessary connections between law and morality, they have very different accounts of the 
nature of that relationship. The exclusive positivist is committed to the view that the relationship is 
instrumental: law necessarily serves morality. The natural lawyer holds that the relationship is at least in 
part intrinsic; morality is intrinsic to the nature of law”). 
92  Id. (“there must be something of a firewall between law and morality”). 
93  SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 24 at 213-4. 
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imposing on officials of a legal system and people in its society what the 
law considers to be moral. To do so, as we have seen, would deprive people 
with right reason to action and thereby vitiate the law’s claim to legitimate 
authority.94 For this reason, for the exclusive positivist, the connection 
between law and morality must entail the thesis that only social facts can 
contribute to law.95 
For the natural lawyer, because law and morality are intrinsically or 
constitutively connected, the law is justified in its imposition of duties and 
obligations, which would not have existed in society but for the law acting 
for the common good.96 By implication, this would mean that for the 
natural lawyer, the law’s moral merit must be apparent to people so that 
they are able to choose to comply with what the law legally and morally 
requires. To the natural lawyer, the law must be obviously congruous with 
the demands of morality so that officials and people to whom to law applies 
are able to see that the demands of the law is justified in its pursuit of the 
common good, decide for themselves what the law requires, and obey it.97  
Thus, as Professor Coleman points out, “in order to determine what the law 
requires, those to whom it is directed must be able to ‘see through’ the law 
to the principles that justify it. Rather than positing a firewall between law 
and morality (as do the exclusive legal positivists), the natural lawyer takes 
the law to be translucent— if not transparent —regarding the principles that 
would justify it.”98 
III.  PART 2: MORAL PSYCHOLOGY IN EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, 
COGNITIVE SCIENCE, AND NEUROSCIENCE 
Research into our moral psychology in the fields evolutionary biology, 
cognitive science, and the neuroscience since the 1990s has revealed some 
important insights into the ontology and epistemology of morality. Studies 
in these fields suggest that the modalities of morality in human beings, as 
opposed to animals who lack a similar capacity to differentiate moral from 
immoral acts,99 developed through evolutionary processes,100 are socially 
contingent,101 and possibly,  emotionally constructed.102 These modalities 
                                                
94  See supra note 80. 
95  See supra note 81. 
96  See supra note 66. 
97  See supra note 65.  
98  Coleman, The Architecture of Jurisprudence, supra note 26 at 55. 
99  See Peter Ulrich Tse, Symbolic Thought and the Evolution of Morality, in MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (VOLUME 1) THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND INNATENESS (Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008), supra note 11 at 286.  
100  Leda Cosmides and John Tooby, Can a General Deontoc Logic Capture the Facts of Human 
Moral Reasoning? How the Mind Interprets Social Exchange Rules and Detects Cheaters, in MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (VOLUME 1), id. at 53-119 (presenting research that suggests that the architecture of 
human cognition developed algorithms that allowed for adaptively engaging in social exchanges and 
reciprocity based on an evolved ability to engage in deontic reasoning about entitlements and 
obligations).  
101  Owen Flanagan, Hagop Sarkissian, and David Wong, Naturalizing Ethics, in MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (VOLUME 1), id. at 19 (stating that most moral knowledge is local and that only some is 
global). See also JESSE J. PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS 191-2 (2007) 
(documenting moral differences across cultures with respect to blood sports and infanticide).  
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work to shape the content of moral norms and produce specific moral 
norms in society. Take for example the moral norm against having sexual 
relations with close family members. We are quick to judge someone who 
commits incest harshly because engaging in sexual relationships with close 
family members seem so immoral. However, there is a non-moral reason 
for our harsh judgment on incestuous relationships. From an evolutionary 
perspective, the behavior of others, such as those who engage in sexual 
relations with close family members that could produce children with 
congenital physical and intellectual malformation, would negatively impact 
our own survival and inclusive fitness in harsh environments.103 In addition 
to the fact that morality could be shown to essentially be relative to the 
society in which it exists, morally significant actions can also be influenced 
by simple heuristics and determined by the unique environment we find 
ourselves in.104   
Despite these studies that suggest that morality, moral judgments, and 
moral intuitions are highly subjective and specific to particularized 
societies and communities, there are also studies that indicate that there is a 
certain degree of objectivity to moral thinking and moral behavior. As an 
example, Professor Paul Bloom has shown that babies as young as three 
months old are capable of judging good and bad behaviors as well as feel 
empathy and compassion towards others, thereby suggesting that some 
moral foundations are inherent to us at birth.105 These research into our 
moral psychology indicate that on one level, moral values are highly 
subjective and dependent on various of influences in our culture and 
environment. Yet, at the same time, there is evidence that some basic moral 
values, such as the desire to be kind to those who are less fortunate than we 
are,106 permeate cultural,  social, and temporal boundaries. These findings, 
as we will see in Part 3 of this paper, have significant effect on the 
discourse in analytical jurisprudence about the connection between law and 
morality. 
A.  MORALITY AS BIOLOGICALLY ADAPTIVE 
From the perspective of evolutionary biology, morality is adaptive and 
develops with its society or community. Documented cases within the 
social sciences, such as social and cultural anthropology, sociology, and 
history, have shown that moral norms, moral sentiments, and moral 
                                                                                                             
102  PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS, id. at 229 (proposing that the practice 
of cannibalism in the Aztec culture passed from generation to generation because of “an anxiety-
inducing set of religious beliefs and emotionally evocative rituals” and stating that “[t]his cocktail of 
material factors, religious beliefs, and emotion is a potent force in the formation, transmission, and 
maintenance of [moral values] values”).  
103  Debra Lieberman, Moral Sentiments Relating to Incest: Discerning Adaptations from By-
Products, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (VOLUME 1) THE EVOLUTION OF MORALITY: ADAPTATIONS AND 
INNATENESS (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008), supra note 11 at 165-9. 
104  Gerd Gigerenzer, Moral Intuition = Fast and Frugal Heuristics, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
(VOLUME 2) THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF MORALITY: INTUITION AND DIVERSITY, supra note 22 at 3. 
105  PAUL BLOOM, JUST BABIES: THE ORIGINS OF GOOD AND EVIL 7-8 (2013). 
106  Id. at 5. 
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intuitions are often specific to their societies and highly dependent on 
epoch, traditions, and cultured habits that have no significant connection to 
ethics, justice, or notions of right and wrong.107 For example, gladiator 
sports of ancient Rome were eventually banned by Christian emperors but 
they were banned not because they were cruel and would have had a 
negative effect on society. Rather, the sport was banned because they 
“presupposed that salvation could be achieved through military valor” 
which “conflicted with the eschatology that Christians were trying to 
teach.”108  Evolutionary biology may explain how morality tended to be 
specific to its society without being necessarily related to propriety or 
decorum. 
Today, there is evidence in evolutionary biology to support the 
hypothesis that our moral psychology and our tendency to pass moral 
judgments on other people could be a by product of psychological 
programs in our brain that evolved over time to ensure the survival of our 
species.  The moral sense that we possess today could be an adaptation of 
our early ancestral predisposition towards the effects of certain actions on 
our ability to survive that had nothing to do with the ethical value of the act 
we have come to judge as commendable or condemnable.   Today, most 
people regard incest as morally wrong.109 However, Professor Debra 
Lieberman presents evidence and argues that these moral sentiments 
towards incest are actually biological processes adapted over time to 
distinguish kin from non-kin, regulate sexual behaviors towards family 
members, and instill inbreeding avoidance measures to assure the survival 
of our species by passing on the strongest genes to the next generation.110 
We “monitor third-party behavior across a number of domains that 
impacted our inclusive fitness (either positively or negatively) in ancestral 
environments” not to pass moral judgment per se but rather “to reduce the 
probability of mating with one’s close genetic relations.”111  
A separate study by Professor Geoffrey Miller theorizes that moral 
virtues such as “intelligence, wisdom, kindness, bravery, honesty, integrity, 
and fidelity”112 advertise good genes and good parenting abilities as a form 
of “costly signaling”113  to assist us in sexual selection of a suitable mate. 
These traits, considered to “often have a moral or quasi moral status,” 
convey information to a potential mate that one possesses “good mental 
health, good brain efficiency, good genetic quality, and good capacity” that 
would allow for “cooperative sexual relationships and investing in 
                                                
107  PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS, supra note 101 at 187-8. 
108  Id. at 188. 
109  JANE MAIENSCHEIN AND MICHAEL RUSE, BIOLOGY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS 278 
(1999). 
110  Lieberman, Moral Sentiments Relating to Incest, supra note 103 at 188. 
111  Id. at 188-9. 
112  Geoffrey Miller, Kindness, Fidelity, and Other Sexually Selected Virtues, in MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY (VOLUME 1), supra note 11 at 209. 
113  Costly signaling theory theorizes that “[i]f a signal is so costly that only high-health, high-
status, high-condition animals can afford to produce it, the signal can remain evolutionary reliable.” Id. 
at 215. 
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children”114 to be sustained over a long period of time. These traits are also 
not “culturally or evolutionarily arbitrary.”115 For example, 79% of all 
sampled cultures (49 out of 62 cultures) considered a secure, stable, low-
conflict, and mutually respectful romantic attachments a normative ideal 
thereby suggesting that mate selection and morality are tightly woven 
across cultures. Our expectation that our chosen mate possesses specific 
moral virtues relates deeply to our biological and emotional need for 
stability, mutual respect, and love and protection of offsprings in our 
intimate relationships. Moral virtues in this context work as a proxy for 
biologically less visible qualities in a mate. 
Science today can explain that the moral sense that we possess and the 
moral judgements that we pass are biologically and evolutionarily 
hardwired into our brains. Behaviors, activities, and traits that we consider 
to be moral or immoral may actually be a by-product of adaptive processes 
that do not have anything to do with morality as conventionally envisioned 
or conceptualized by theologians and philosophers. Sometimes, moral 
sentiments are so hardwired into our psyche that we are not able to explain 
or provide reasons for why we hold on to these sentiments so strongly.116 It 
bears mentioning that these sentiments may not always convey accurate 
information about the virtue or vice, or the morality or immorality, of an 
act. Sometimes strongly held moral sentiments say nothing at all about the 
morality or immorality of an act. 
B.  MORALITY AS FAST AND FRUGAL HEURISTICS  
When Professors Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky introduced the 
prospect theory as a descriptive model of decision making under risk and as 
an alternative to the more well-known expected utility theory, they 
identified two separate phases in the decision-making process when 
someone makes decisions under circumstances in which the outcome is 
uncertain.117 The first stage of decision-making under risk is the editing 
phase where a decision-maker makes a preliminary analysis of the different 
prospects (or choices) before him or her, which most of the time “yields a 
simpler representation of those prospects,” and organizes and reformulates 
the options “so as to simplify subsequent evaluation and choice.”118 A 
subsequent phase of evaluation then allows the decision-maker to evaluate 
                                                
114  Id. at 209. 
115  Id. 
116  PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS, supra note 101 at 30 (commenting on 
a study about moral attitudes towards consensual incest. When participants in the study were asked to 
provide the reason for why consensual sex between siblings, which was kept secret, enjoyed by both, 
and done with the use of contraceptives, was morally wrong, and couldn’t, most resorted to unsupported 
emotional exclamations rather than change their view about their initial moral judgement that incest 
between siblings was wrong.).  
117  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 
ECONOMETRICA, 47(2), 263-91 (1979). 
118  Id.  
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the edited prospects and “the prospect of highest value [would then be] 
chosen.”119   
According to Professors Kahneman and Tversky, “[b]ecause the editing 
operations facilitate the task of decision, it is assumed that they are 
performed whenever possible” with “some editing operations either 
permit[ting] or prevent[ing] the application of others.”120 In their seminal 
paper, Professors Kahneman and Tversky discussed “choice problems 
where it is reasonable to assume either that the original formulation of the 
prospects leaves no room for further editing, or that the edited prospects 
can be specified without ambiguity.”121 Subsequent literature on the subject 
of decision-making under risk addressed the fact that most decisions made 
under uncertain conditions are based upon the reliance on heuristic 
principles that “reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and 
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.”122 While quite useful, 
these heuristics can sometimes lead to “severe and systematic errors”123 in 
that decision. Heuristics provide an alternative explanation to human errors 
in the outcome of a decision without suggesting that the decision is 
necessarily irrational.  
Cognitive science suggests that our moral actions, decisions, and 
judgements could also be subject to the same type of heuristics that lead to 
errors when decisions are made under uncertain circumstances. Professor 
Gerd Gigerenzer notes that heuristics can have a profound impact on moral 
actions and while the resulting moral action may be morally reprehensible 
in some situations and commendable in others, “the underlying heuristics, 
however, is not good or bad per se.”124 As an example, Professor 
Gigerenzer points out that simple rules were behind two different morally 
significant actions that had huge ethical impacts on the society in which 
they operated. In the first morally significant action, ordinary men who 
were a part of the Reserve Police Battalion 101 were asked to march into a 
Polish village and take Jewish men of working age to a work camp and kill 
women, children, and the elderly on the spot at the request of their 
commander. They were given the option of stepping out if they did not feel 
up to the task.  
Out of 500 men, only a dozen stepped out. The rest went on to raid the 
village and killed the villagers they were not able to take to work camp. 
These men who committed the massacre were physically affected and 
emotionally distraught thereafter. But when asked why they committed the 
act, they said that they felt “the strong urge not to separate themselves from 
the group by stepping out, even if this conformity meant violating the 
                                                
119  Id. 
120  Id.  
121  Id.  
122  Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristic and biases, in 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos 
Tversky eds., 1982). 
123  Id.  
124  Gerd Gigerenzer, Moral Intuition = Fast and Frugal Heuristics, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 
(VOLUME 2), supra note 22 at 3. 
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moral imperative “Don’t kill innocent people.”125  It appeared that for most 
of the men, it was easier to choose to kill innocent people than to break 
ranks. The social heuristic that was influential over the men’s decision was  
the heuristic to not break ranks.126 In the case of organ donors,127 whether 
people became organ donors or not depended on their country’s default rule 
on organ donation. Countries that had explicit-consent rules that required a 
person to opt in to become an organ donor, such as the United States and 
United Kingdom, saw less organ donors than presumed consent countries, 
such as France and Hungary, where everyone is a donor unless they opt out 
of being on. The social heuristic that applied here was that “if there is a 
default, do nothing about it.”128  
As risky prospects are first processed through an editing phase where a 
decision-maker makes preliminary analyses of the prospects before him or 
her and where simple heuristics can be highly influential in the decisive 
outcome of that decision-maker, how a prospect is framed in the mind of 
the decision-maker really matters because framing effects create the 
illusion that the outcome of one prospect is necessarily better than 
another.129 Our moral intuitions are also subject to framing effects in many 
circumstances.130 Professor Walter Sinnott-Armstrong has suggested that 
because our moral intuitions are subject to heuristics and framing effects, 
our moral intuitions are not in themselves justified just because they are 
moral intuitions.131  In fact. because our moral intuitions are subject to 
heuristics and framing effects, they are unreliable in  providing normative 
force and therefore are not justified unless they are backed up by inferential 
confirmation. 132  In Professor Sinnott-Armstrong’s view, moral 
intuitionism—the claim that that “some moral beliefs are justified 
independently of the believer’s ability to infer those moral beliefs from any 
other beliefs”133—is false because no moral intuition can be justified non-
inferentially and without reference to some other reliable belief.134 As the 
underlying heuristics for moral intuitions are sometimes questionable, the 
validity of moral intuitions in themselves become a contentious matter. 
C.  MORALITY AS AN OBJECTIVE FACT 
Despite these studies showing moral norms to be socially and culturally 
contingent, unreliable, and evolutionarily adaptive, studies in 
                                                
125  Id. at 1-2. 
126  Id. at 2.  
127  Supra note 22. 
128  Id. at 3. 
129  Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in CHOICES, VALUES, 
AND FRAMES 9-10 (Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky eds. 2009). 
130  Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Endowment 
Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, id. at 168-70. 
131  Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Framing Moral Intuitions, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (VOLUME 2), 
supra note 22 at 48 (“The fact that our moral intuitions seem justified does not show that they really are 
justified.”). 
132  Id. at 52. 
133  Id. at 48. 
134  Id. at 74. 
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developmental psychology and neuroscience suggest that there is some 
universality and ubiquity to our moral senses. Professor Paul Bloom, who 
conducted a series of experiments with babies and very young children at 
the Yale Infant Cognition Center,135 believes that some aspects of 
morality—the capacity to be compassionate and kind to others and to judge 
others who lack the capacity to be compassionate and kind harshly—are 
hardwired into the human nature. A baby’s moral senses, as Professor 
Bloom puts it, “do not come from the mother’s knee, or from school or 
church; they are instead the products of biological evolution”136 and are not 
acquired through a learning process. In Professor Bloom’s experiments, he 
found that babies have a general appreciation for what would be judged 
good and bad behavior by adults.137 Babies had the capacity to empathize 
and would soothe a person who was in pain,138 they share,139 feel guilt,140 
expect fairness,141 and prefer nice puppets to mean puppets.142 These studies 
show that at some fundamental level through evolution, we are born 
equipped with a rich moral sense that allows us to empathize, have 
compassion, prefer goodness over evil, and have a basic understanding of 
fairness and justice. 
As babies take time to grow, their brains capacity for moral reasoning 
only develops fully much later in life. But as children grow, their 
understanding of morality still develops according to a “universal sequence 
of stages,”143 which would indicate that morality is ubiquitous to human 
nature to a certain extent. Studies in the neurosciences on adult 
psychopaths and “acquired sociopaths” show that children with 
psychopathic tendencies and adult psychopaths do not possess the capacity 
to distinguish moral wrongs from conventional wrongs. Unlike normal 
individuals, psychopaths are not able to know if an act would be considered 
a moral wrong.144 It is established in neurology that damage to specific 
brain circuits result in psychopathy. Trauma to the prefrontal cortex in the 
brain, for example, can transform a responsible railroad manager and 
husband into “an impulsive, irresponsible, promiscuous, apathetic 
individual”145 while damage to the prefrontal lobe and orbital frontal cortex 
could result in acquired sociopathic personality or pseudopsychopathy in 
                                                
135  BLOOM, JUST BABIES, supra note 105 at 8 (Professor Bloom and his collaborators works 
with children as young as 3 months old). For a description of the experiments that are conducted at the 
Yale Infant Cognition Center, see id. at 23-30. 
136  Id. at 8. 
137 Id. at 30. 
138  Id. at 48 (although their attempts to soothe are far from perfect and can sometimes be 
egocentric in nature e.g. a toddler bringing his crying friend to his own mother instead of his friend’s 
mother). 
139  Id. at 52. 
140  Id. at 55-6. 
141  Id. at 62-4. 
142  Id. at 98-9. 
143  Jerome Kagan, Morality and Its Development, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (VOLUME 3) THE 
NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, BRAIN DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT 299-303 (Walter 
Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008). 
144  Id. at 174-5. 
145  Kent A. Kiehl, Without Morals, in MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (VOLUME 3) THE NEUROSCIENCE 
OF MORALITY, supra note 143 at 123. 
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patients.146 As a hypothesis, Professor Kent Kiehl further posits that the 
converging evidence in neuroscience “suggests that psychopathy is 
associated with a dysfunction of the paralimbic system.”147 These studies 
signify that the healthy human brain has the natural capacity to grasp 
objective moral values behind their actions, whether moral or immoral. The 
fact that damage to particular neural regions of the brain causes deviation 
in an individual's capacity for moral reasoning would support a claim that 
there is a certain objectivity to moral values.  
IV.  PART 3: ANALYTICAL JURISPRUDENCE AND MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 
If research in the natural sciences suggest that morality is socially and 
culturally contingent, subject to heuristics and framing effects, and 
evolutionarily adaptive, the two concepts highly dependent on morality in 
analytical jurisprudence—validity and legitimacy—become marginal. 
Since these research in natural sciences hypothesize, and to some extent 
prove, that morality is not necessarily the ideal standard to help us 
differentiate right from wrong actions, morality cannot, and should not, be 
used to provide normative force to the natural lawyer’s concept of valid 
laws and the exclusive legal positivist’s concept of legitimate governance. 
The natural lawyer relies on morality as an essential component of law to 
provide laws with the power to bind people and impose on them legal and 
moral duties to comply with the law’s demands, making laws that are 
incongruous to morality’s demands defective and not deserving of the 
status of law. The exclusive legal positivist puts morality as the end goal 
that law must serve for law to claim legitimate authority over people and 
justify its imposition of coercive force in society. Without acting in the 
service of morality in order to claim legitimate authority, the law’s demands 
would be no different from the highway robber’s demands that money be 
handed over at the point of a gun.148         
Since the exclusive positivist maintains that laws and morals must be 
separated in their analysis of the concept of law to ensure that laws work in 
the service of morality, the exclusive legal positivist treats moral intuitions, 
judgments, and perspectives about the law distant. By keeping moral 
arguments separate from what law is, the legal positivist expects that the 
law and its legal system be able to address and correct moral problems in 
society.149 The legal positivist’s insistence that only social facts - and not 
moral facts - can contribute to the content of law provides the foundation 
by which laws may claim legitimate authority to govern because by 
keeping moral facts out of the law, officials of a legal system would not be 
                                                
146 Id. at 124. 
147  Id. at 148.  
148  Mattias Kumm, The Best Times and the Worst Times: Between Constitutional Triumphalism 
and Nostalgia, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 208 ( Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin, 
eds. 2010). 
149  SHAPIRO, LEGALITY, supra note 93. 
9 - Ng Book Proof.docx (Do Not Delete) 4/27/17  3:32 PM 
2017] Picking at Morals 517 
imposing on people, through the law, what the law considers to be moral 
and depriving them with the right reason to act.150 As Professor Hart 
explains, a “concept of law which allows the invalidity of law to be 
distinguished from its immorality, enables us to see the complexity and 
variety of the separate [moral] issues” that surround the law.151 
Keeping morality separate from the law to provide the foundation for 
the law’s claim to legitimate authority, however, could be the very feature 
of exclusive legal positivism that vitiates the law’s claim to legitimate 
authority. Since prospect theory predicts that people’s decisions can be 
affected by how prospects are presented or framed, it would be fairly easy 
for the law to impose its own morality on people without their realization 
by framing prospects. Economic actions by the state can be welcomed or 
admonished based on how that economic plan is introduced to the public.152 
As people are considered to make persistent errors in their decision-making 
when they make decisions under uncertainty, there is room for governments 
and the law to guide people through “choice architecture” towards 
decisions that are perceived to be in their best interest.153 Choice 
architecture, even if purported to be in the best interest of the community,  
would still amount to state imposition of moral beliefs on people and that 
will operate to deny the law of its very claim to legitimacy because, by 
knowingly manipulating the decision-making process to nudge people 
toward the desirable decision, it deprives people of the right reason to act.  
For the natural lawyer, on the other hand, validity is based on law and 
morality being constitutively connected.154 The incorporation of morality 
into the law would justify the laws  imposition of duties and obligations 
because by incorporating morality, the law would be acting  for the 
common good and be binding. Valid, or moral, laws would thus provide 
people with reason for action to pursue the common good.155 To provide 
these reasons, laws have to be visibly just and fair to allow people with 
reasons to comply with what the law mandates. People must be able to 
“‘see through’ the law to the principles that justify it.”156 The law-maker, 
thus, has a duty in the natural and moral order to create just laws to fulfill a 
                                                
150  Supra note 94. 
151  HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9 at 207. 
152  People are more willing to give up a gain than to incur a loss. So, imposing a surcharge 
(which is seen as more of a loss) is considered to be more unfair than eliminating a discount (which is 
seen as more of a reduction of a gain). This distinction between perceived losses and reduction of gain 
“explains why forms that charge cash customers one price and credit card customers a higher price 
always refer to the cash price as a discount rather than the credit card price as a surcharge.” 
Furthermore, “a 7 per cent cut in real wages is judged reasonably fair when it is framed as a nominal 
wage increase, but quite unfair who it is posed as a nominal wage cut.” See, Kahneman, Knetsch, and 
Thaler, Anomalies: supra note 130 at 169. 
153  RICHARD H. THALER AND CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2009).  
154  Supra note 96. 
155  ROBERT P. GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 120 (“Law provide beings capable of 
grasping and acting on reasons with (additional) reasons for action. Where the laws are just, they 
provide conclusive reason for action”). 
156  Supra note 98. 
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moral purpose so that the principles of free choice, practical reasoning,157 
and morality have a place in the legal order. 
As legal validity is dependent on laws incorporating morality so that 
they are just, much of the concept of legal validity turns on reliable and 
universal moral norms that will provide law with its normative force. 
Natural law theory presupposes an objective standard for morality and 
always pursues the common good.158 We, however, see that morality is far 
from objective, that moral judgments and decisions are often subject to 
heuristics, and moral intuitions adaptive, socially contingent, and 
unreliable. Because so many variables go into what eventually becomes a 
society’s common morality, it is difficult to see how positive law’s 
conformity to objective morality—considered in natural law theory to be 
self-evident159—would justify the imposition of duties especially when the 
natural sciences present evidence that morality evolved and adapts with 
cultures and societies.160 
In addition, common morality and the common good sometimes 
deviate in fundamental ways from what natural law would teach about 
moral truths. One of the most basic form of moral value that positive laws 
should pursue to be congruous with morality is the value of life.161 Life 
would be considered a “common good” for most communities.162 But 
documented cases of moral norms throughout the world show divergence in 
the form and practice of those moral norms. Infanticide, for example, is a 
common practice in cultures all over the world.163 In Inuit culture, 
infanticide is an acceptable practice that may be justified in extremely 
harsh conditions where resources are limited and where group survival may 
necessitate infanticide as a form of “population control.”164 Natural law 
theory would assert that an Inuit law imposing on families a duty to commit 
infanticide would be invalid, improperly called law, and not binding 
because it does not pursue the basic good of preserving life. Individuals 
who decide not to abide by such a law would be morally justified and the 
law cannot bind them. But to say that this rule cannot properly be called a 
law and is invalid because it does not pursue life as a basic good - even if 
people in that culture recognize and accept the rule as binding165—ignores 
the fact that laws make difficult calculuses all the time. Natural law 
theory’s rejection of consequentialist methods of moral reasoning in favor 
of self-evident basic goods166 necessitates inferential confirmation that 
                                                
157  Practical reasoning is the bringing in of principles of natural law into the “practical 
deliberation and judgment in situations of morally significant choice.” GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF 
NATURAL LAW, supra note 155 at 104-5. 
158  Id. at 229. 
159  Id. at 85-7. 
160  Supra note 110.  
161  FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS, supra note 2 at 86. 
162 Id at. 155. 
163  PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS, supra note 101 at 189. 
164  Id. at 190. 
165  The rule of recognition is used by Professor Hart as the criteria for legal validity in legal 
positivism. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9 at 97-107. 
166  GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW 120, supra note 158. 
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some moral values are indeed universal, objective, and self-evident. That 
way, natural law theory's concept of legal validity will have a more 
significant role in explaining the law's normative force. Research in the 
field of neuroscience and developmental psychology, which show that 
damage to certain parts of the neural circuit in the brain results in 
deficiencies in effective moral reasoning and judgement,167 might provide 
natural law theory with the evidentiary support it needs for its assertion that 
moral values are universal and ubiquitous.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
To this point, morality in analytical jurisprudence has assumed a 
metaphysical and theoretical character. The role morality plays in 
understanding the concept of law is, however, pivotal because it provides 
answers to questions about law’s normativity and where concepts such as 
rights, duties, obligations, and sanctions obtain their normative force. Thus 
far, we have assumed that moral norms provide a reliable measure of right 
and wrong actions and decisions. We have also assumed that moral 
intuitions are irrefutable just because they are intuitions. But morality, as 
the natural science is showing us, is far more nuanced and varied than we 
have come to assume. Some moral norms, such as the norm that incestuous 
relationships are forbidden, have less to do with propriety, righteousness, or 
civility, and more to do with developed biological aversions to inbreeding 
among kins.168 Other moral norms, such as the norm that it is wrong to kill 
an innocent person as with gladiatorial sports, emerged because of political 
reasons rather than rectitude.169 These new aspects about morality that the 
natural sciences are showing us should be considered seriously in the 
conceptualization of law in analytical jurisprudence. Morality, if it is an 
unreliable source of good conscience, cannot provide laws with the 
normativity needed to establish legal validity from natural law’s 
perspective or maintain legitimate authority for the exclusive legal 
positivist. If neuroscience and developmental psychology produce more 
findings on how neural circuits in the brain function to process moral facts, 
it may be determined that some forms of morality, such as the desire to be 
kind and compassionate,170 are in fact ubiquitous. And if neuroscientists are 
able to one day build a map of the brain, we may be able to determine with 
some definiteness through brain science what sort of moral reasoning exists 
as a universal feature of humankind.171 Until then, it would pay to exercise 
some caution in how much faith we place on morality as a standard setting 
norm for separating right from wrong actions for the purposes of legal 
analysis and conceptualizing the nature of law.    
                                                
167  Supra notes 135-147. 
168  Supra note 110. 
169  Supra note 108. 
170  Supra note 136-142. 
171  Mike Howrylycz, Building Atlases of the Brain, in THE FUTURE OF THE BRAIN 14 (Gary 
Marcus and Jeremy Freeman eds., 2015) (“Development of large-scale brain atlases is now a major 
undertaking in the neuroscience”). 
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